

Message Text

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R 311110Z MAR 77
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INFO CINCPAC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 3076

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US

SUBJ: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: CERP 0001

1. A. US INTERESTS

PAKISTAN IS A MICROCOSM OF MANY OF NZSE IMPORTANT US
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS NOTED IN THE S/P AND NEA
PAPERS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE ON MATTERS OF SPECIFIC
INTEREST TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SUCH AS NON-PROLIFERATION,
ARMS TRANSFERS, THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
HOW WE COPE WITH THESE QUESTIONS IN PAKISTAN WILL PROVIDE
GUIDELINES AND EXPERIENCES ON HOW WE MEET SIMILAR CONCERNS
IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER NATIONS.

MOST OF OUR MAJOR INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN MUST BE SEEN IN
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A MULTILATERAL, RATHER THAN BILATERAL, SETTING. IT IS OFTEN
NOT A QUESTION OF LOOKING AT PAK/US RELATIONS IN A VACUUM,
BUT RATHER HOW OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AFFECT US GLOBAL AND
MULTILATERAL INTERESTS.

IT IS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TIME TO DRAFT THIS MESSAGE,
ESPECIALLY THE OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES SECTIONS, SINCE THE

COUNTRY IS UNDERGOING CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC STRESS AND IT IS AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER WILL LAST OUT HIS NEW FIVE YEAR TERM. THIS CABLE IS WRITTEN ON THE ASSUMPTION WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH A BHUTTO GOVERNMENT. IF THAT CHANGES, MANY OF THE CONDITIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT FOLLOW WILL NECESSARILY CHANGE AS WELL. THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF US INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN IS NOT IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE - INTERESTS MAY CHANGE DEPENDING UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME.

A PRIMARY AMERICAN INTEREST IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN IS FOSTERING REGIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA. THIS IS A FUNCTION OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND HOW PAKISTAN PERCEIVES ITS SECURITY. A CONFIDENT AND SECURE PAKISTAN, AND ONE WITHOUT EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS, HEIGHTENS REGIONAL STABILITY. A WEAK AND INSECURE PAKISTAN FOSTERS INSTABILITY IN THE AREA AND IS CONSEQUENTLY NOT IN OUR INTERESTS.

ANOTHER PRIMARY US OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. PAKISTAN, WHICH IS PURCHASING A REPROCESSING PLANT FROM FRANCE, HAS BECOME ONE OF THE FEW COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD WHERE WE WILL BE DIRECTLY TESTING OUR ABILITY TO STEM THE TIDE OF PROLIFERATION. PAKISTAN WILL BE A LITMUS TEST OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY.

A FURTHER INTEREST WE HAVE IS IN LIMITING THE PRODUCTION OF NARCOTICS IN PAKISTAN AND STOPPING THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN PAKISTANI ORIGIN NARCOTICS.

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IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT, WE ALSO HAVE AN INTEREST IN KEEPING OUR TIES WITH PAKISTAN WARM AND AMICABLE BECAUSE OTHER NATIONS MORE IMPORTANT TO US GLOBALLY ARE INFLUENCED BY OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD PAKISTAN. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SHAH HAS OFTEN EXPRESSED HIS INTEREST IN A SECURE AND VIABLE PAKISTAN AND UNDOUBTEDLY SEES OUR SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN AS PARALLELING HIS OWN INTERESTS. IN A SIMILAR WAY, CHINA IS CLOSE TO PAKISTAN AND HAS VIEWED US SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN AS AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OF OUR INTEREST IN COUNTERING THE GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA. BECAUSE OF PAKISTAN'S ISLAMIC CHARACTER, US SUPPORT FOR ISLAMABAD IS GREETED WITH FAVOR IN MOST ARAB CAPITALS.

OTHER COUNTRIES' INTERESTS, LIKE OUR OWN, VARY FROM TIME TO TIME, AND THE THREE EXAMPLES MENTIONED ABOVE MAY HAVE EITHER DECLINING OR INCREASING INTEREST IN PAKISTAN'S FUTURE. HOWEVER AS LONG AS PAKISTAN IS IMPORTANT TO THEM, AND THEY ARE IMPORTANT TO US, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT PAKISTAN'S WELL-BEING.

WE HAVE LIMITED BILATERAL INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN. OUR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL INTERESTS ARE NOW SMALL. WE ALSO HAVE LIMITED STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ONES WE DO HAVE ARE CENTERED MORE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN THAN ON THE PAKISTAN MAINLAND. WE HAVE LIMITED INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN, (E.G. WE HAVE NO JOINT ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION STATIONS IN COUNTRY). PAKISTAN'S INTELLIGENCE VALUE RESTS, IN PART, IN ITS VALUE AS A CONVENIENT LOCATION TO GATHER INFORMATION ON NON-PAKISTAN TARGETS. THE ABILITY TO VISIT KARACHI PORT FREQUENTLY, EVEN FOR NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS, IS IMPORTANT FOR THE US NAVY, BUT IS NOT ON OUR LIST OF ESSENTIAL US INTERESTS IN THE AREA.

WE ALSO HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF PAKISTAN AS IT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTES TO THE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY AND THE REGION. TO THIS END WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED

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\$4.8 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN. OUR INTERESTS IN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 3076

AN ECONOMICALLY VIABLE PAKISTAN ARE MANIFEST IN THE CONSIDERABLE BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AMERICAN SUPPORT IN THE DEVELOPMENT FIELD.

I. B. OVERVIEW

LOOKING AHEAD OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS, MOST OF OUR IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN, FROM REGIONAL STABILITY TO NON-PROLIFERATION, WILL BE AFFECTED BY PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF ITS OWN SECURITY. THE BASIS FOR THIS PERCEPTION WILL BE, MOST IMPORTANTLY, PAKISTAN'S VIEW OF THE MILITARY EQUATION BETWEEN ITSELF AND INDIA AND HOW QUICKLY THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO GROWS. PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS DIRECTLY AFFECT THREE ISSUES OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE US OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.

THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN LIMITING PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ASPIRATIONS AND STEMMING THE DANGERS OF PROLIFERATION WILL BE A DIRECT FUNCTION OF WHETHER THE GOP THINKS IT IS MILITARILY SECURE. SIMILARLY, IT IS IMPORTANT

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TO PAKISTAN WHERE WE END UP ON FORMULATING A NEW GLOBAL CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER POLICY. THE GOP LOOKS TO US AS SUPPLIERS OF SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF THE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY IT THINKS IT NEEDS. THIS PERCEPTION, AND OUR REACTION TO IT WITHIN THE CONFINES OF OUR EVOLVING POLICY, WILL AFFECT OUR INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN AND PAKISTAN'S VIEW OF THE US OVER THE NEAR AND MID-TERM.

FINALLY, OUR OWN SECURITY COMMITMENTS TO PAKISTAN AND HOW WE INTERPRET THOSE COMMITMENTS WILL AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP AND OUR INTERESTS. THE GOP'S CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD WILL FOCUS ON OUR CENTO RELATIONSHIP AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, OUR 1959 SECURITY TREATY.

GOP DOMESTIC POLICY MAY HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. IF A CONSISTENT PATTERN OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS EMERGES, THIS COULD EASILY EXACERBATE US/PAK RELATIONS AND AFFECT U.S. ECONOMIC AID. ALSO, THE VAGARIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MARKET AND CHANGE IN TRAFFICKING PATTERNS MAY ALSO BRING PAKISTAN MORE INTO THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS LIMELIGHT WITH CONSEQUENT POSSIBLE STRAINS IN PAK/US RELATIONS.

A FURTHER ELEMENT AFFECTING OUR RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE PAKISTAN'S ROLE AS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT THIRD WORLD NATION. THE GOP HAS BEEN TAKING THE LEAD AS A SPOKESMAN FOR THE THIRD WORLD IN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC FORUMS, AND THE GOP IS USING THE MAJOR ECONOMIC ISSUES SEPARATING THE

DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING WORLD AS A VEHICLE TO PUSH ITS OWN
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE THIRD WORLD. HOW TACTFULLY AND
CONSTRUCTIVELY PAKISTAN PLAYS THAT ROLE, AND HOW CONTROLLED
SHE CAN BE IN HER ACTIONS, WILL OBVIOUSLY AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP.

FINALLY, HOW OUR INDIAN OCEAN POLICY EVOLVES WILL ALSO
AFFECT OUR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN. THE GOP WILL BE WATCHING
OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD DIEGO GARCIA, COMIDEASTFOR, AND FORCE
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REDUCTION TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF
HOW THEY AFFECT ITS OWN SECURITY.

I.C. OBJECTIVES

BASED UPON OUR PRESENT INTERESTS AND FUTURE CONCERNS,
AS NOTED ABOVE, VARIOUS US OBJECTIVES IN PAKISTAN BECOME
EVIDENT. WE HAVE A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE IN ACHIEVING OUR NON-
PROLIFERATION GOALS IN PAKISTAN. FUNDAMENTALLY, THIS MEANS
THAT PAKISTAN EITHER CANCELS OR INDEFINITELY POSTPONES PLANS
TO ACQUIRE A NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT. A SECOND OBJECTIVE
IS THE CONTINUATION OF QUIET AND REASONED BILATERAL TIES.
THIS HAS BEEN THE TREND OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND WE
SHOULD STRIVE TO HAVE IT CONTINUED. THIS WOULD INVOLVE
ASSURING THE GOP OF OUR INTEREST IN ITS SECURITY AND WELL-BEING
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME AVOIDING ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE
PAKISTAN SIDE OF WHAT OUR OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS ARE.
AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE CONTINUATION OF REASONED TIES
WILL BE FURTHER COOPERATION ON SHIP VISITS AND OTHER MILITARY
EXERCISES FROM WHICH BOTH SIDES BENEFIT.

A FURTHER OBJECTIVE AND ONE CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH
THE FIRST TWO, WILL BE TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN A
RESPONSIBLE AND MODERATE ARMS TRANSFER POLICY AND HELPING
PAKISTAN ENSURE ITS BASIC SECURITY. WE MUST BE REASON-
ABLE IN OUR APPROACH TO THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER
QUESTION AND NOT FUEL AN ARMS RACE IN THE AREA. AT THE
SAME TIME WE MUST BE MINDFUL THAT WE WILL BE BETTER ABLE
TO SEE OUR BASIC INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN AND THE REGION SERVED
IF WE ARE DEALING WITH A REASONABLY SECURE, RATHER THAN AN
INSECURE PAKISTAN.

IN THE NARCOTICS FIELD, OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO
REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF PAKISTAN'S NARCOTICS IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE BY A TWO PRONGED APPROACH. FIRST BY REDUCING
PRODUCTION IN PAKISTAN THROUGH BETTER ENFORCEMENT BY
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THE GOP OF PRODUCTION CONTROLS, AND SECOND, BY ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ILLICIT TRADE LEAVING THE COUNTRY.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO INFLUENCE THE GOP TO PROTECT AND GUARANTEE BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN PAKISTAN IN A MANNER THAT WILL HOLD OUT THE BEST CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THIS GOAL. IF WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS BEGINNING A SYSTEMATIC PROGRAM OF

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R 311110Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 638
INFO CINCPAC
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL KARACHI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 3076

CONSISTENT AND GROSS VIOLATIONS OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, WE WOULD RECOMMEND TIMELY AND, AT FIRST, LOW-KEY EXPRESSIONS OF OUR INTEREST AND CONCERN AS THE BEST STRATEGY.

A FURTHER US OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE ENSURING A STABLE INDIAN OCEAN. THIS DIRECTLY AFFECTS PAKISTAN IN SEVERAL WAYS. ANY ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO COMIDEASTFOR WILL NECESSITATE AN INCREASED US NAVAL PRESENCE IN PAKISTAN. OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO ARRIVE AT AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE GOP THAT WILL ALLOW US AN INCREASED PRESENCE IN A MANNER WHICH BENEFITS BOTH OUR NATIONS. ALSO, IF WE EMBARK ON INDIAN OCEAN FORCE LIMITATION TALKS WITH THE

SOVIET UNION, ONE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO INFORM THE GOP IN ADVANCE OF OUR PLANS TO NEGOTIATE AND KEEP THEM CLOSELY INFORMED THROUGHOUT OF THE PROGRESS OF THE TALKS. IN GENERAL, WE SHOULD MAKE A PRACTICE OF KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GOP ON ANY ACTIONS WE TAKE AFFECTING THE INDIAN OCEAN.

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ANOTHER OBJECTIVE WE SHOULD HAVE IN THE AREA IS ENCOURAGING BOTH IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA TO INCREASE THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUBCONTINENT. ALTHOUGH THEIR INTERESTS AND INVESTMENTS ARE ALREADY CONSIDERABLE, THE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY THEY CARRY, THE LESS WILL DEVOLVE UPON US.

WE SHOULD CONTINUE, AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST, TO ENCOURAGE BETTER PAK/AFGHAN AND PAK/INDIAN RELATIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO GREATER STABILITY IN THE AREA.

OUR GENERAL AID OBJECTIVE IS TO ENCOURAGE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN. ASSUMING THAT THE "NEW DIRECTIONS" THRUST IN OUR AID LEGISLATION IS RETAINED, WE WILL WANT TO DO THIS BY INVOLVING OURSELVES IN PROGRAMS WHICH DIRECTLY BENEFIT PAKISTAN'S POOR MAJORITY. ON THE COMMERCIAL SIDE, WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO INCREASE US EXPORTS TO PAKISTAN. IN THE ABSENCE OF U.S. COMMERCIAL FINANCING, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE PARTICULARLY ON MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS FUNDED BY OTHER EXTERNAL DONORS.

AS PAKISTAN BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN THE THIRD WORLD, WE SHOULD HAVE AS A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE ENCOURAGING THE GOP TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE DEVELOPING AND THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES. THE PRIMARY VEHICLE FOR DOING THIS WILL BE KEEPING THE GOP INFORMED OF OUR POSITION AS IT DEVELOPS AND WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE GOP ON ISSUES OF SUFFICIENT POTENTIAL DIRECT BENEFIT TO PAKISTAN THAT THEY WILL ENGAGE PAKISTAN'S PRAGMATIC INCLINATIONS. THE ISSUES OF GREATEST INTEREST, AS WE NOW FORESEE THEM, ARE LIKELY TO BE RESOURCE TRANSFER, DEBT RELIEF AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION.

ALL ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN HELPING ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE USIS

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COUNTRY PLAN INCLUDES SECTIONS SUPPORTIVE OF OUR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND TRADE OBJECTIVES. ODRP PLAYS A CENTRAL
ROLE IN OUR CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES POLICY AND DEA IN OUR
NARCOTICS OBJECTIVES.
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